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Abstract—Power system functionality is determined by the
evaluation of the power system state estimation (PSSE). Thus,
corruption of the PSSE may lead to severe consequences, such as
financial losses, substantial maintenance damage, and disruptions
in the electricity distribution. Classical bad data detection (BDD)
methods, developed to ensure PSSE reliability, are unable to
detect well-designed attacks, named unobservable false data
injection (FDI) attacks. In this paper we develop novel sparse
methods for the detection of unobservable FDI attacks and for
the identification of the attacked buses’ locations. Furthermore,
the proposed methods can be used for estimation of the attack’s
extent. Hence, it also enables evaluation of the PSSE by removing
the estimated attack from the measurements. The proposed
methods are based on formulating structural, sparse constraints
on both the attack and the load demand. First, we exploit these
constraints in order to compose an appropriate model selection
problem. Then, we develop the associated generalized information
criterion (GIC) for this problem, which is widely employed
in signal processing. For large networks, the GIC selection
method is time consuming with computational complexity that
grows exponentially with the network size. Thus, we develop
two low-complexity methods: 1) an orthogonal matching pursuit
(OMP)-based method that relies on the proposed structural
and sparse constraints; and 2) a new method that exploits
the graph Markovian property of order two of the graph
representation of the electricity network, i.e. the second-neighbor
relationship between the power system buses. The performance
of the proposed methods is evaluated on IEEE standard test
systems.
Index Terms—unobservable false data injection (FDI), power
system state estimation (PSSE), attack detection and identifica-
tion, structural constraints, model selection, orthogonal matching
pursuit (OMP), graph Markovian property
I. INTRODUCTION
MODERN electrical grids are continuously controlled byenergy management systems (EMS). The EMS evalu-
ates the power system state estimation (PSSE) for multiple
monitoring purposes, including stability assessment, control,
and security [1], [2]. The PSSE is computed based on mea-
surements that are transmitted from meters deployed in the
network. In order to ensure the reliability of the measure-
ments, residual-based detection methods have been developed
as an integral part of the PSSE in the EMS [1]. However,
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classical, residual-based, bad data detection (BDD) methods
cannot detect well-designed attacks, named unobservable false
data injection (FDI) attacks [3], [4]. Unobservable FDI at-
tacks are achieved by manipulating measurements based on
the power network topology [3], where the topology matrix
can be estimated by analyzing system measurements [5]–
[11]. Unobservable FDI attacks may inflict severe economic
and hardware damage by influencing the PSSE [12]–[16].
Therefore, appropriate tools for the detection, identification,
and estimation of these attacks, that ensure the reliability of
the PSSE, are crucial for obtaining high power quality and
maintaining stable power system operation.
Several attempts to solve the problem of the detection of
unobservable FDI attacks have been proposed in the literature.
Methods that strategically protect a basic set of measurements
were proposed in [17]–[22]. In the same context, the use
of synchronized phasor measurement units (PMUs) has been
suggested [21], [23], [24]. However, these approaches require
additional hardware that may result in high cost and a long
installation period, and may cause other security vulnerabilities
[25]–[27]. Detection by the moving target defense method,
in which the system configuration is actively changed, has
been proposed in [28]–[31]. However, in this method, effective
attack detection carries the cost of operating far from the
optimal state and, thereby, incurring economic losses [32].
Detection based on machine learning and data mining have
been suggested in [33], [34], but these methods require a large
set of historic data, which is usually unavailable. Detection
using load forecasting has been suggested in [35], [36], but
obtaining a reliable forecast is not always possible and may
require extensive resources [37]. Sparse optimization tech-
niques are suggested in [22] and [38], but require restrictive
assumptions, for instance that there are multiple time mea-
surements and at each time the attack takes place at different
buses. In conclusion, all the above mentioned methods require
additional hardware, a large amount of historical data, or
restrictive assumptions, and, thus, cannot serve as practical
solutions for the detection of unobservable FDI attacks in
current power systems. Moreover, there is no existing method
for unobservable FDI attack identification, i.e. the localization
of the attacked buses, and for PSSE evaluation in the presence
of this attack.
In [39], [40] we have shown that anomalies caused by
unobservable FDI attacks can be detected by using the Graph
Fourier Transform (GFT) in the context of graph signal
processing (GSP) tools. In this work, we suggest a novel
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2compressive sensing (CS) approach that not only has better
detection performance than the GSP method in [39], [40], but
also provides identification of the attacked buses, an estimation
of the attack, and a modified PSSE that reduces estimation
errors caused by the attack. Reconstruction of sparse signals
and CS techniques have become a foremost research area
in the last two decades (see e.g. [41]–[43] and references
therein). In power systems, CS algorithms [44] have been
proposed in the context of multi-line outage identification
in transmission networks [45]–[47], gross error identification
[48], identification of imbalances [49], and BDD [50].
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we
formulate structural and sparse constraints for both the attack
and the change in power consumption between two consecu-
tive time samples. Accordingly, we represent the attack by
a sparse number of dictionary elements, i.e. the topology
matrix columns. Next, since the typical load change cannot be
approximated by a sparse number of dictionary elements, we
formulate a model selection problem, where in each model the
attack is assumed to be represented by a different set of dictio-
nary elements. Based on the model selection formulation and
the generalized information criterion (GIC) selection rule [51],
we develop structure-constrained methods for the detection,
identification, and estimation of unobservable FDI attacks. As
a by-product, the proposed method can be used for obtaining
the PSSE by removing the estimated attack. However, the
proposed GIC-based method requires an exhaustive search
that grows exponentially with the network scale. Therefore,
for large networks we develop two low-complexity methods:
1) a method that is based on the state-of-the-art orthogonal
matching pursuit (OMP) algorithm [52] that relies on the
proposed structural and sparse constraints; and 2) a new
method that is based on the graph Markovian property of order
two, i.e. second-neighbor relationship [53]. Finally, we show
by numerical simulation that the proposed GIC, OMP, and
GM-GIC methods outperform the detection performance of
existing methods. Simulations show that the attacked buses
can be identified, which enables the PSSE evaluation.
A. Organization and notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we introduce the background on the model of the
power flow equations, BDD, and unobservable FDI attacks.
In Section III we present our approach for the detection and
identification of unobservable FDI attacks. In Section IV we
develop two low-complexity methods for large networks. In
Section V a simulation study is presented. Finally, the paper
ends with conclusions in Section VI.
In the rest of this paper vectors are denoted by boldface low-
ercase letters and matrices are denoted by boldface uppercase
letters. The operators ||·|| and ||·||0 denote the second norm and
the zero seminorm, respectively, where the latter specifies the
number of non-zero elements in the vector. The operators (·)T
and (·)−1 denote the transpose and inverse operators, respec-
tively. The projection and the orthogonal projection operators
for a matrix A ∈ RM×K with a full column rank are given
by PA = A(ATA)−1AT and P⊥A = I − PA, respectively.
The linear space spanned by the A matrix columns is denoted
by col(A). For any index set, Λ ⊂ {1, . . . , L}, θΛ is the |Λ|-
dimensional subvector of θ containing the elements indexed
by Λ, where |Λ| denotes the set’s cardinality. For any two
index sets, Λ1 and Λ2, AΛ1,Λ2 is the submatrix composed by
the columns and rows of A associated with the index sets
Λ1 and Λ2, respectively. The submatrix AΛ1,: is composed of
the A matrix rows corresponding to the index set Λ1, while
the submatrix A:,Λ2 is composed of the A matrix columns
corresponding to the index set Λ2.
II. BACKGROUND
A. DC model
The power system network can be defined by a set of
buses, V = {0, 1, . . . N}, and a set of transmission lines,
which is denoted by E . Each transmission line connects two
buses, where the transmission line connecting buses n ∈ V
and k ∈ V is denoted by the pair (n, k) ∈ E . Furthermore,
according to the pi-model of transmission lines [1], each line,
(n, k) ∈ E , is characterized by an admittance, Yn,k. Based
on this representation, the DC power flow model, which is
a linearized representation of the power measurements in the
power system, is considered with the following assumptions:
a.1 Branches are considered without resistance losses, which
results in Yn,k = Bn,k, where Bn,k is the susceptance of
the (n, k) transmission line.
a.2 The bus voltage magnitudes, Vn, n = 1, 2, . . . , N , are
approximated by 1 per unit (p.u.).
a.3 The differences in bus voltage angle between adjacent
buses are assumed to be small such that:
sin(θn − θk) ≈ θn − θk, ∀(n.k) ∈ E .
Based on Assumptions a.1-a.3, the DC model of the active
power injections in the buses is given by [1]:
Pn =
∑
k:(n,k)∈E
Pn,k =
∑
k:(n,k)∈E
Bn,k(θn − θk), (1)
∀ n ∈ V . Similarly, the DC model of the active power flows
in the transmission lines satisfies
Pn,k = Bn,k(θn − θk), ∀ (n, k) ∈ E . (2)
In this paper we assume that there are given active power
measurements, denoted by z = [z1, · · · , zM ]T ∈ RM , that in-
clude the power injections in (1) and the power flows in
(2). In addition, θ = [θ1, ..., θN ]T denotes the state vector
and includes the bus voltage angles at all buses except the
slack bus. Accordingly, the matrix-form noisy and attacked
DC power flow model can be written as:
z = Hθ + a+ e, (3)
where the topology matrix, H, is a constant M ×N Jacobian
matrix, which is composed of the susceptance elements, Bn,k,
in equations (1) and (2) (as described, for example, in [54]).
In addition, e ∈ RM is a zero-mean Gaussian additive noise
vector with covariance matrix R, i.e. e ∼ N (0, R). The attack
is denoted by a ∈ RM . Usually, it is assumed that the
3adversary has the ability to manipulate up to Ka << M
meters [54]. Therefore, in this paper we assume that
a ∈ AKa 4= {a : ||a||0 = Ka}, (4)
i.e. the attack vector, a, is sparse and has at most Ka nonzero
entries.
B. Power system state estimation (PSSE)
The PSSE is implemented by using meter measurement data
from (3). In addition, it is typically computed as a weighted
least squares (WLS) estimator [1]:
θˆ
WLS
=argmin
θ∈RN
(z−Hθ)TR−1(z−Hθ)
=Kz,
(5)
where
K = (HTR−1H)−1HTR−1. (6)
In order to robustify the PSSE against errors, classical
BDD methods are implemented in the EMS [1]. These BDD
methods are based on the residual error,
r = z−HθˆWLS = (I−HK)z, (7)
where the last equality is obtained by substituting the estimated
state vector as defined in (5). The residual error from (7) is
used, for example, in the Largest Normalized Residual rNmax-
test and the χ2-test [1], also referred to as the J(x)-detector,
which is given by:
TBDD = ||z−HθˆWLS||2
H1
≷
H0
γBDD, (8)
where H1 is the hypothesis that bad data is assumed, maybe
as a result of an attack, and H0 is the null hypothesis. The
threshold, γBDD, is determined so as to obtain a desired false
alarm rate. However, both the Largest Normalized Residual,
which is an identification method, and the χ2-test, which is
a detection method, are inappropriate for unobservable FDI
attacks, as described in the next subsection.
C. Unobservable FDI attacks
The unobservable FDI attack satisfies
a
4
= Hc, (9)
where c ∈ RN is an arbitrary constant vector. By substituting
the well-designed attack from (9) in the observation model
from (3) we obtain
z = H(θ + c) + e. (10)
From a comparison between the models in (3) and in (10)
it can be verified that by observing z one cannot distinguish
between the state vector, θ, and its corrupted version caused
by an injected state attack, θ + c, where both θ and c are
unknown vectors. That is, the estimator of the state vector, θ,
based on (10), is biased and is identical to the estimator in
(5), which was developed under the no-attack scenario from
(3). As a result, by using the unobservable FDI model in (10)
and the WLS estimation, the residual error in (7) satisfies
r = (I−HK)e. (11)
Thus, the residual error does not provide information on
the presence of an unobservable FDI attack. Consequently,
all residual-based methods, as well as all the other methods
that are based solely on the model in (10), will fail to
detect unobservable FDI attacks. Therefore, new methods for
the identification of manipulated measurements that integrate
additional structural and physical constraints are required.
It should be noted that data-based methods can be used
to detect unobservable FDI attacks if those attacks differ
significantly from the typical feasible region of the measure-
ments. For example, one may suggest the use of the following
conventional energy detector:
T ENG = ||z||2
H1
≷
H0
γENG, (12)
where γENG is a chosen threshold. However, this energy
detector is not sensitive enough for attack detection, as demon-
strated in the simulations in Section V.
III. STRUCTURE BASED APPROACH FOR THE
IDENTIFICATION OF UNOBSERVABLE FDI ATTACKS
Considering the unobservable FDI attack formation and
further sparsity restrictions, the additional power caused by
the attack is constrained to a small subset of buses in the
network. Therefore, in this section a new framework that is
based on observing power changes in small subnetworks of
the system is proposed. First, the new model is developed
in Subsection III-A. Then, in Subsection III-B, we develop
a novel identification method for unobservable FDI attacks
based on the new framework. By using the identification
solution, in Subsection III-C we develop a method for PSSE
in the presence of an attack. It should be noted that the
proposed framework is designed specifically for unobservable
FDI attacks with the associated measurement model from (10).
For the general case of both unobservable attacks, random
attacks, and bad data, the measurement can be preprocessed
by conventional BDD methods that remove conventional faulty
measurements. Then, the reconstructed measurements at the
output of the conventional PSSE can be used as the input
measurement for our approach.
A. Structural-constrained model for unobservable FDI attacks
The proposed framework, which facilitates structural con-
straints on the unobservable FDI attack and on the typical load
demand, is constructed by applying the following definitions
and assumptions:
A.1 Difference-based model: In a similar manner to in [35],
two consecutive time samples are observed, where the
first time sample is considered to be free from malicious
attacks and the second may contain an unobservable FDI
attack.
A.2 Restricted measurements: Since generator buses are
heavily secured and have direct communication with
4the control center [55], we assume that generator bus
measurements could not be manipulated. Similarly, it
is assumed that ‘zero load’ measurements cannot be
manipulated. Therefore, the set of buses that can be
attacked only includes the load buses, and is denoted by
L, where L ⊂ V .
A.3 State sparsity: The number of manipulated state vari-
ables is sparse, and is assumed to be smaller than Kc,
i.e ||c||0 ≤ Kc. This assumption stems directly from
the sparsity restriction on manipulated network meters,
defined in (4), as shown in the simulation section in [3].
Thus, we define the set
GKc := {Λ ⊂ V : 1 ≤ |Λ| ≤ Kc}, (13)
which includes all possible supports of c associated with
all possible unobservable FDI attacks.
A.4 Typical loads change: Power systems could be regarded
as quasi-static systems with slight changes over a short
time [56]. Therefore, a relatively small change in the
loads measurements is considered. In addition, the typical
loads change w.r.t. the actual buses’ load measurements
at a specific moment is determined by the change in the
consumption demand [57], and, thus, this change can be
considered to be non-sparse and non-related to the system
topology matrix.
It can be seen that Assumptions A.1-A.3 define structural
constraints on the attack, while Assumption A.4 defines a
structural constraint on the typical loads change.
From Assumption A.1, the difference-based model is
achieved by taking the difference between two consecutive
time samples that satisfy the model in (10), with c = 0 for the
first time sample and an arbitrary c in the second time sample.
Thus, the difference-based observation model is given by:
∆z = H(c+ ∆θ) + ∆e, (14)
where ∆θ is the change in the state vector, θ, between the two
time samples. Furthermore, by assuming that the noises of the
two consecutive time samples are independent, we obtain that
the difference-based measurement noise in (14) is distributed
in accordance with ∆e ∼ N (0, 2R), where, for the sake of
simplicity, we assume 2R = σ2eI.
According to Assumption A.2, only the changes in the load
buses’ measurements are relevant for the attack. Thus, the
relevant measurement model for the detection of attacks is
obtained by taking only the load measurements from (14),
which results in
∆zL = HL,:(c+ ∆θ) + ∆eL, (15)
where ∆zL is the change in load measurements, HL,: is the
associated submatrix of the topology matrix H, and ∆eL is
the corresponding noise.
Assumption A.3 states that the state attack vector support,
Λ, is in the set GKc . Therefore, there exists an element
Λi ∈ GKc , where i = 1, 2, · · · , |GKc |, such that the attack on
the load measurements is given by:
aL = HL,:c = HL,ΛicΛi , (16)
where |Λi| << |V|. By substituting (16) in (15) we obtain
∆zL = HL,ΛicΛi +HL,:∆θ + ∆eL. (17)
Furthermore, Assumption A.4, implies that the power of the
unattacked loads change without noise, HL,:∆θ, is bounded.
This assumption can be mathematically formulated as:
||HL,:∆θ||2 < η, (18)
where η is a system tuning parameter that can be obtained from
the power system statistics, based on historical values. In addi-
tion, from Assumption A.4, HL,:∆θ cannot be represented as
a sparse combination of the columns of the submatrix, HL,Λi ,
for any Λi ∈ GKc . Therefore, it is assumed that the projection
of HL,:∆θ onto the column space of the submatrix, HL,Λi ,
results in a significant loss in power as follows:
||PΛiHL,:∆θ||2 << ||HL,:∆θ||2, (19)
where
PΛi
4
= HL,Λi(H
T
L,ΛiHL,Λi)
−1HTL,Λi (20)
is the projection matrix to the space col(HL,Λi). The combi-
nation of the inequalities in (18) and (19) implies that
||PΛiHL,:∆θ||2 < α|i, (21)
where
α|i << η. (22)
The inequalities in (21) and (22) show that the projection of
HL,:∆θ on col(HL,Λi) is small w.r.t. the network parameters.
In contrast, by using the properties of projection matrices it
can be verified that the projection of HL,ΛicΛi onto the space
of the attack support remains unchanged, i.e.
PΛiHL,ΛicΛi = HL,ΛicΛi . (23)
Accordingly, the projection of the measurement vector in (17)
onto col(HL,Λi), which is a smaller subnetwork of the system,
satisfies
PΛi∆zL = PΛi(HL,ΛicΛi +HL,:∆θ + ∆eL)
= HL,ΛicΛi +PΛi(HL,:∆θ + ∆eL),
(24)
where the last equality is obtained by substituting (23).
It can be seen that the projected measurement vector in (24)
is the sum of the noise and two terms: 1) additional power
caused due to the attack, HL,ΛicΛi , which is not affected by
the projection onto col(HL,Λi), as described in (23); and 2)
the projection of the unattacked loads change without noise,
PΛiHL,:∆θ, which suffers a significant decrease in power
due to the said projection, as described in (21). Therefore,
(21) and (23) imply that the attack, HL,ΛicΛi , is significantly
larger than the projected loads component PΛiHL,:∆θ, i.e.
||PΛiHL,:∆θ||2 << ||HL,ΛicΛi ||2; ∀Λi ∈ GKc . (25)
By applying the property in (25) in (24) we obtain that the
projected measurement vector can be approximated by
PΛi∆zL ≈ HL,ΛicΛi +PΛi∆eL; ∀Λi ∈ GKc . (26)
Now, from the properties of projection matrices, it can be
verified (see, e.g. p. 25 in [58]) that the measurement vector
5in (17) can be uniquely decomposed into:
∆zL = PΛi∆zL +P
⊥
Λi∆zL
= PΛi∆zL +P
⊥
Λi(HL,:∆θ + ∆eL)
≈ HL,ΛicΛi +P⊥ΛiHL,:∆θ + ∆eL; ∀Λi ∈ GKc ,
(27)
where P⊥Λi
4
= I − PΛi is the orthogonal projection matrix,
the second equality is obtained by substituting (23), and the
approximation is obtained by substituting (26). It can be
seen that in the new, approximated model in (27), the attack
component, HL,ΛicΛi , and the orthogonally projected loads
component, P⊥ΛiHL,:∆θ, belong to orthogonal subspaces, and
therefore are separable. This decomposition is the basis for the
development of the proposed identification methods that are
performed by testing each optional attack subspace and, thus,
making the FDI attacks observable in the relevant subspace.
B. Identification of unobservable FDI attacks
Based on the model from (27), the task of identifying the
subset of attacked buses, Λi, can be done by selecting from
amongst the multiple hypotheses:
H0 : ∆zL = HL,:∆θ + ∆eL
Hi : ∆zL = HL,ΛicΛi +P⊥ΛiHL,:∆θ + ∆eL,
i = 1, . . . , |GKc |,
(28)
where each hypothesis Hi in (28) assumes a different support
Λi ∈ GKc for the state attack vector c, and the null hypothesis
H0 is obtained by substituting c = 0 in (15). In the following
method, we derive the identification of unobservable FDI
attacks by selecting the most likely hypothesis in (28), given
the measurement vector ∆zL. That is, we find the most
suitable choice of attack support, Λi, from the set of candidate
supports, {GKc ∪ ∅}, that provides the “best” description of
the observations, ∆zL.
Selecting the most likely hypothesis in (28) is done by
using the GIC selection rule [51], which is widely employed
in signal and array processing. The GIC method chooses the
hypothesis Hi which maximizes the sum of two terms: the
likelihood term for data encoding, evaluated at the ML points,
L(·), and a penalty function, τ(·), that inhibits the number
of free parameters of the model from becoming very large.
For the considered model in (28) and a given difference-based
state vector ∆θ, the GIC is given by:
GIC(Λi, τ(|Λi|, |L|)) 4= 2L(∆zL; cˆML|iΛi ,∆θ)− τ(|Λi|, |L|),
(29)
where L(∆zL; cˆ
ML|i
Λi
,∆θ) is the log-likelihood function of ∆z
under the ith hypothesis, which is associated with the support,
Λi, and cˆML|i is the associated ML estimation of the state
attack vector, c. Therefore, in the general case the GIC term
is a function of ∆θ, which is an unknown deterministic vector.
However, it will be shown that under Assumptions A.1-A.4,
the suggested selection rule is independent of ∆θ and, thereby,
is a proper rule. The term τ(|Λi|, |L|) is a penalty function,
which increases with the number of free unknown parameters
under the ith hypothesis, i.e. the number of manipulated state
variables, |Λi|, and could be dependent on the number of load
buses, |L|. In particular, two special cases of the GIC family
are the minimum description length (MDL) and the Akaike
information criterion (AIC), for which the penalty term is
given by:
τ(|Λi|, |L|) = |Λi|
{
2 AIC
log |L| MDL . (30)
Further discussion on the penalty term is provided in the
simulation study in Section V.
Based on (28), under each hypothesis, i, the log-likelihood
function of the measurements under a given ∆θ is
L(∆zL; cΛi ,∆θ) = −
|L|
2
ln 2piσ2e
− 1
2σ2e
||∆zL −HL,ΛicΛi −P⊥ΛiHL,:∆θ||2.
(31)
Continuing, the ML estimation of the state attack vector, cΛi ,
is found by maximizing (31) w.r.t. cΛi . Since (31) is a concave
function w.r.t. cΛi , the ML estimation is obtained by equating
the derivative of (31) w.r.t. cΛi to zero:
∂L(∆zL; cΛi)
∂cΛi
∣∣∣∣
cΛi=cˆ
ML|i
Λi
=
1
2σ2e
HTL,Λi(∆zL −HL,Λi cˆML|iΛi −P⊥ΛiHL,:∆θ) = 0.
(32)
Hence, from (32), the ML estimator is given by:
cˆ
ML|i
Λi
= (HTL,ΛiHL,Λi)
−1HTL,Λi(∆zL −P⊥ΛiHL,:∆θ)
= (HTL,ΛiHL,Λi)
−1HTL,Λi∆zL,
(33)
where the last equality is obtained from the properties of
projection matrices that satisfy
(HTL,ΛiHL,Λi)
−1HTL,ΛiP
⊥
Λi = 0.
By substituting the ML estimator from (33) in (31), we obtain
L(∆zL; cˆ
ML|i
Λi
,∆θ)
= −|L|
2
ln 2piσ2e −
1
2σ2e
||P⊥Λi(∆zL −HL,:∆θ)||2.
(34)
From the properties of projection matrices, it can be verified
(see, e.g. p. 46 in [58]) that
||P⊥Λi(∆zL −HL,:∆θ)||2
= ||(∆zL −HL,:∆θ)||2 − ||PΛi(∆zL −HL,:∆θ)||2.
(35)
In addition, by substituting (26) into (24) it can be verified
that
PΛiHL,:∆θ ≈ 0; ∀Λi ∈ GKc . (36)
In conclusion, substituting (36) into (35) gives
||P⊥Λi(∆zL −HL,:∆θ)||2
≈ ||(∆zL −HL,:∆θ)||2 − ||PΛi∆zL||2; ∀Λi ∈ GKc .
(37)
By substituting (34) and (37) into (29), we obtain that the
GIC for the selection of the set of attacked buses is based on
6choosing the hypothesis which maximizes
GIC(Λi, τ(|Λi|, |L|)
= −|L| ln 2piσ2e −
1
σ2e
||(∆zL −HL,:∆θ)||2
+
1
σ2e
||PΛi∆zL||2 − τ(|Λi|, |L|)
(38)
w.r.t. i = 0, 1, . . . , |GKc |. Since the term
−|L| ln 2piσ2e −
1
σ2e
||(∆zL −HL,:∆θ)||2
is independent of the hypothesis, i.e. not a function of Λi,
we conclude that the GIC rule from (38) can be obtained by
choosing the hypothesis which maximizes
GIC(Λi, τ(|Λi|, |L|) = 1
σ2e
||PΛi∆zL||2 − τ(|Λi|, |L|),
(39)
i = 0, 1, . . . , |GKc |. For the null hypothesis, in which Λ0 = ∅,
we use the convention that PΛ0∆zL = 0.
It can be seen from the GIC in (39) that the selected
hypothesis is the one that maximizes the sum of the two terms:
1) the projection of the load measurements onto the associated
“attack subspace”, i.e. col(HL,Λi), by computing PΛi∆zL;
and 2) a penalty function, −τ(|Λi|, |L|), that keeps the attack
sparse. By using (9) and the invariant property of the ML
estimation [59], the estimated attack in the ith hypothesis is
given by:
aˆML|i = H:,Λi cˆ
ML|i
Λi
. (40)
In addition, by substituting (20) and (33) into (40) we obtain
aˆML|i = PΛi∆zL. (41)
Finally, by substituting (41) in (39) the GIC term can be
written as
GIC(Λi, τ(|Λi|, |L|) = 1
σ2e
||aˆML|i||2 − τ(|Λi|, |L|). (42)
Thus, an alternative interpretation for the GIC is that it directly
measures and compares the estimated unobservable FDI attack
under each of the hypotheses, while considering a penalty
function that encourages sparse solutions.
The proposed structural-constrained GIC algorithm for the
identification of unobservable FDI attacks is provided in Al-
gorithm 1. Detection of unobservable FDI attacks is obtained
as a by-product of the identification procedure. Depending on
the hypothesis selected by the structural-constrained GIC in
Algorithm 1, for the given measurements ∆zL, the proposed
structural-constrained GIC-based detector decides that there is
no attack if s = 0, that is, the null hypothesis, H0, is selected.
Otherwise, for s 6= 0, the presence of an unobservable FDI
attack is detected.
C. PSSE in the presence of unobservable FDI attacks
In this subsection, we develop the PSSE in the presence
of unobservable FDI attacks, based on the identification re-
sults from the Subsection III-B. In the previous subsections,
we used the difference-based model from (15), which con-
tains the relevant information for identification and detection
Algorithm 1: Structural-constrained GIC
Input:
• difference-based measurements: ∆z
• network parameters: H, L
• set of candidate state attack supports: GKc
• GIC penalty function: τ(·, ·)
Algorithm Steps:
1) compute the GIC test from (39) for each Λi ∈ GKc by
GIC(Λi, τ(|Λi|, |L|)) = 1
σ2e
||PΛi∆zL||2 − τ(|Λi|, |L|),
where PΛi is defined in (20).
2) select the hypothesis s if
s = arg max
i∈0,...,|GKc |
GIC(Λi, τ(|Λi|, |L|))
Output: selected hypothesis: s
(difference-based model with only the load measurements). In
this subsection, we use the full model of the two consecutive
power measurement vectors directly at times t and t + 1,
zt, zt+1, both of which satisfy (10) as described in the
following.
According to Assumption A.1, the measurement vector at
time t is free of malicious attacks. Thus, it is obtained by
substituting c = 0 in (10):
zt = Hθt + et. (43)
Therefore, the WLS estimator of the state at time t, θt, can be
obtained similarly to the derivation of the conventional PSSE
given in (5)-(6), which results in
θˆt = Kzt. (44)
Similarly, the measurement vector at time t+1 is obtained by
substituting an attack with an arbitrary contribution, c, which
is not necessarily zero in (10), to obtain
zt+1 = Hc+Hθt+1 + et+1. (45)
It should be noted that by subtracting (43) from (45) and
substituting ∆θ = θt+1 − θt and ∆e = et+1−et in the result,
we obtain
zt+1 = ∆z+ zt, (46)
where ∆z is the difference-based measurement vector in (14).
From (43), (45), and (46), the attack component Hc is the
same in zt+1 and ∆z. Accordingly, we use the difference-
based model to estimate the state attack vector as described in
(40) and subtract the estimated attack from the measurement
vector in (45), in order to obtain “clean measurements” at time
t+ 1,
zt+1 −H:,ΛscML|sΛs . (47)
Then, similarly to the development of the WLS estimator in
(5)-(6), the WLS estimator of θt+1, based on (45) and (47),
can be developed to obtain
θˆ
WLS|s
t+1 = K(zt+1 −H:,ΛscML|sΛs ). (48)
7In particular, when the identification output implies that there
is no attack, i.e. s = 0 and accordingly Λs=0 = ∅, the WLS
estimator of θt+1 is given by
θˆ
WLS|s=0
t+1 = Kzt+1. (49)
IV. LOW-COMPLEXITY IDENTIFICATION METHODS
According to Assumption A.3, the cardinality of the set that
includes all optional supports associated with unobservable
FDI attacks is
|GKc | =
Kc∑
k=0
(|V|
k
)
. (50)
As a result, the number of hypotheses in (28) increases
exponentially with the number of buses, |V|, and the maximal
sparsity level, Kc. Thus, the implementation of the structural-
constrained GIC in Algorithm 1 requires an exhaustive search
that includes the evaluation of the GIC test from (39) for
all candidate models, i.e. for any hypothesis Hi; i =
1, . . . , |GKc |. Therefore, the proposed structural-constrained
based GIC approach is impractical for large power systems.
In this section, we develop two low-complexity methods: 1)
an OMP-based method [52] that relies on Assumptions A.1-
A.4; and 2) a novel method that exploits the graph Markovian
property of order two between the nodes (buses) in the graph
representation of the power system [53].
A. OMP method
The OMP algorithm in [52] is an efficient method for the re-
covery of a sparse signal. The basic principle behind the OMP
algorithm is to iteratively find the support set of the sparse
vector. The OMP method proceeds by finding the column
of the compressed sensing (CS) matrix that correlates most
strongly with the signal residual. The residual is constructed in
each iteration by projecting the measurements onto the linear
space spanned by the remaining columns, i.e. the columns that
were not selected in previous iterations.
In this subsection, we apply the OMP algorithm for the
sparse recovery of the state attack vector, c, which is a sparse
signal as described in Assumption A.3, from the measurements
in (15). It should be noted that the measurement model in
(15) contains a nuisance parameter vector, HL,:∆θ, which is
not a part of the conventional sparse model. Nevertheless, we
justify the use of the OMP algorithm by showing that under
the structural and sparse constraints, defined in Assumptions
A.1-A.4, the nuisance parameter has a minor affect that can
be neglected.
The main iteration of the OMP algorithm performed on
the load measurements model from (15) is given as follows.
Suppose Λ(j) is the estimated support set of c in the jth
iterative step. In the j + 1th iteration, we compute
k = arg max
k˜∈V
||Pk˜rSC-OMP|(j)||2, (51)
where Pk˜ is obtained by replacing Λi = k˜ in (20), and
rSC-OMP|(j) = P⊥Λ(j)∆zL (52)
Algorithm 2: Structural-constrained OMP
Input:
• difference-based measurements: ∆z
• network parameters: H, V , L
• maximal sparsity level: Kc
• stopping rule threshold: γOMP
Initialization:
fix j = 0 and set the temporary solution and signal
residual to:
Λ(0) = ∅, rOMP|(0) = ∆zL
Main iteration: increment j (up to Kc) and apply
1) maximization: find k such that
k = arg max
k˜∈V
||Pk˜rSC-OMP|(j−1)||2
2) stopping rule: if ||PkrOMP|(j−1)||2 < γOMP set
j = j − 1 and stop
3) update support: compute
Λ(j) = {Λ(j−1) ∪ k}
4) update signal residual: compute
rOMP|(j) = P⊥Λ(j)∆zL
Output: estimated support: Λs = Λˆ(j)
is the signal residual at the jth iteration. By substituting (52)
and P⊥
Λ(j)
= I−PΛ(j) on the r.h.s. of (51) we obtain
||PkrOMP|(j)||2 = ||Pk(I−PΛ(j))∆zL||2
= ||Pk∆zL −PkPΛ(j)∆zL||2.
(53)
By limiting the number of iterations to the maximal sparsity
level Kc we obtain that Λ(j) ∈ GKc . Therefore, under
Assumptions A.1-A.4 and from (26), the nuisance parameter
contribution to the load measurements, HL,:∆θ, has a minor
influence on the terms Pk∆zL and PΛ(j)∆zL. As a result,
the nuisance parameter has a minor influence on (53), and
can be neglected in the OMP selection procedure in (51).
The proposed structural-constrained OMP algorithm for the
identification of unobservable FDI attacks is provided in
Algorithm 2.
Although the OMP algorithm is used in a wide variety of
applications, it has no optimal signal recovery guarantees. In
addition, high performance by the OMP algorithm is usually
obtained by using an incoherent dictionary [42], where in our
case, the CS matrix, i.e. the topology matrix HL,:, may be
highly correlated forcing high mutual coherence for the CS
matrix. Therefore, in the following subsection, we present
an alternative approach, in which we develop a novel low-
complexity method that uses the power system graph repre-
sentation Markovian properties.
B. Graph Markovian low-complexity GIC (GM-GIC)
The power system can be represented as a weighted undi-
rected graph, G = (V, E ,Y), where the set of vertices, V ,
8is the set of buses (generators, loads, or ‘zero loads’) and
the edge set, E , is the set of transmission lines between these
buses. Each transmission line, (k,m) ∈ E , connects two buses,
m ∈ V and k ∈ V , and is characterized by the reactance
value, Yk,m > 0, which is considered as a weight in the
associated graphical model. In this subsection, by using the
graphical representation of the power system, we develop the
graph Markovian low-complexity GIC (GM-GIC) method for
the identification of unobservable FDI attacks. The GM-GIC
method is based on the fact that the graphical model of the
power system has a second order Markov property with respect
to the graph [53] and is described in detail in the following.
We consider the measurement model in (15)-(16), where
Λ ⊂ V is the true support of the state attack vector. The attack
in (16) can be decomposed as follows:
aL = HL,:cΛ = HL,:
∑
k∈Λ
Ekc =
∑
k∈Λ
HL,kEkc, (54)
where the matrix Ek has a single nonzero element
[Ek]k,k = 1. We define the the attack on node k ∈ Λ as
akL
4
= HL,kEkc. (55)
That is, the attack aL can be represented as a sum of the
influences inflicted by the single nodes that belong to the
support Λ. The projection of the attack on node k ∈ Λ, akL,
onto the measurement subspace associated with node m ∈ V ,
col(HL,m), is
ak,m
4
= Pma
k
L, ∀k,m ∈ V. (56)
In addition, for any two buses (vertices), k and m, the
geodesic distance [60] between them, d(k,m), is defined as the
minimum number of edges one would have to traverse in order
to get from one bus to the other. In the Appendix it is proved
that for the considered model, in which the measurement noise
is Gaussian, the following properties are obtained:
ak,m = 0, ∀k,m ∈ V, d(k,m) > 2, (57)
and
||ak,m||2 ≤ ||ak,k||2, ∀k,m ∈ V. (58)
The proof is based on the graph Markovian property that the
noises of the power measurements of any pair of nonadjacent
nodes are conditionally independent given the remaining noise
values [53]. The result in (57) implies that the attack on node
k, defined in (55), does not affect the measurement subspace
associated with node m if the geodesic distance between the
nodes is larger than 2. In addition, (58) implies that the attack
influence on the attacked node k is equal to or higher than the
influence of the attack (on node k) on a different node m.
Based on the results in (57) and (58), we propose a four-
stage algorithm. In the first stage of the GM-GIC method, we
apply a single bus detector on the measurements in (15) in
order to extract a reduced set composed of suspicious nodes:
S ⊂ V 4= {m ∈ V : ||Pm∆zL||2 > ρ}, (59)
k
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Fig. 1. An illustration of a segment of a large-scale network in
the presence of an unobservable FDI attack with Λ = {k,m}.
The sets (regions) Nk and Nm are the affected regions defined
in (63). In addition, the sets (regions) Sq and Sr are the
partitions of an optional set S.
where according to (20):
Pm = HL,m(HTL,mHL,m)
−1HTL,m, (60)
and ρ is a user defined threshold.
Now, let us assume that there is only an attack on a single
node, Λ = k ∈ V . According to (26), for an attack at node k,
the projected measurement vector on the subspace col(HL,m)
can be approximated by
Pm∆zL ≈ PmakL +Pm∆eL, ∀k,m ∈ V. (61)
Now, let m be an element in S, that is, Pm∆z in (61)
is larger than a threshold, ρ. From (57)-(58), the probabil-
ity Pr(m ∈ Λ) is larger than Pr(k ∈ Λ, 1 ≤ d(k,m) ≤ 2),
where there is a single attack at node k. Similarly,
the probability Pr(k ∈ Λ, 1 ≤ d(k,m) ≤ 2) is larger than
Pr(k ∈ Λ, d(k,m) > 2) in this scenario. Moreover, for nodes
with a geodesic distance, d(·, ·), from an attacked node that is
larger than 2, the probability of being larger than the threshold,
i.e. Pr(k ∈ Λ, d(k,m) > 2), is small and only depends on the
noise distribution. Thus, we can expect that if a node belongs
to the set S, then it is most likely to be an attacked node,
or, with a lower likelihood, the node is a second-order or
first-order neighbor of an attacked node. In addition, it is
shown in [61] that each node in the power system network
is connected to 2−5 nodes. Therefore, under Assumption A.3
(state sparsity), and for a reasonable threshold value, ρ, the
cardinality of the suspicious set S can be bounded by
|S| ≤ 52Kc. (62)
Since the maximal sparsity level Kc is significantly smaller
than the number of nodes in the network, i.e. Kc << |V|,
then, |S| can be assumed to be significantly smaller than |V|.
Thus, the computational complexity of searching among the
set S for attacked buses is much smaller than the complexity
of searching in V .
In the second stage of the GM-GIC method, we divide S
into disjoint sets, {Sq}Qq=1. To this end, we define the second-
9order neighborhood of a node k by
Nk = {m ∈ V : 0 ≤ d(k,m) ≤ 2}, ∀k ∈ V, (63)
and divide S in the the following manner. If node k is in the
subset Sq , then node m is in the same subset, m ∈ Sq , if and
only if
∃{lt}Tt=1 ⊆ S : {Ns ∩Nl1} 6= ∅, {Nl1 ∩Nl2} 6= ∅, . . . ,
{NlT ∩Nl} 6= ∅.
(64)
As a result, elements in different subsets, S1 and S2 must
obtain
k ∈ S1,m ∈ S2 : {NKnk ∩NKnm } = ∅. (65)
That is, ∀k ∈ Sq and ∀m ∈ Sr, q 6= r, an attack on node k
does not affect node m and vice versa. A detailed algorithm
for the partition of S into disjoint subsets {Sq}Qq=1 is described
in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Partition of S into disjoint subsets
Input:
• set of suspicious buses: S
• second-order neighborhood: Nm,m ∈ S
Algorithm Steps: initialize: Q = 0 and advance on
m ∈ S:
1) if Q = 0 then Q = Q+ 1, SQ = m, and continue;
2) for q = {1, . . . , Q}:
• if ⋃
s∈Nq
{Ns ∩Nm} 6= ∅
then Tq = 1, else Tq = 0.
3) if
sum
q={1,...,Q}
Tq = 0
then Q = Q+ 1, SQ = m, and continue;
4) update:
Sq∗ =
⋃
q:Tq=1
{Sq ∪m},
where q∗ = min
Tq=1
q.
5) set Tq∗ = 0
6) remove Sq from {Sq}Qq=1 if Tq = 1.
7) update: Q = Q− sum
q={1,...,Q}
Tq
Outputs:
• number of subsets: Q
• disjoint subsets: {Sq}Qq=1
In the third stage of the GM-GIC method, we apply the
structural-constrained GIC in Algorithm 1 on each of the
subsets as a separate network. The main difference between
this stage and the structural-constrained GIC algorithm in
Algorithm 1 is the set of possible state attack vector supports,
GKc , as defined in (13), which is significantly reduced by re-
placing V with Sq . By denoting Λˆq as the output of Algorithm
1 applied on the subset Sq , the joint estimated support that
includes all the separate results of applying Algorithm 1 on
each subset, is obtained by
ΛˆGM-GIC =
Q⋃
q=1
Λˆq. (66)
In the fourth stage of the GM-GIC method the estimated
support in (66) is corrected to satisfy |ΛˆGM-GIC| ≤ Kc. That
is, if the number of elements in ΛˆGM-GIC is higher than
the maximal sparsity level, Kc, then we keep only the Kc
elements in ΛˆGM-GIC with the highest influence, i.e. the highest
absolute values, in the state attack ML estimation, cˆML|i
ΛˆGM-GIC
,
obtained by substituting Λi = ΛˆGM-GIC in (33). Therefore, by
sorting cˆML|i
ΛˆGM-GIC
in a descending order, i.e.
I 4= {i1, i2, . . . , i|ΛˆGM-GIC|} = sort(cˆML|iΛˆGM-GIC), (67)
the estimated support is obtained by
ΛˆGM-GIC = {i1, i2, . . . iKc}. (68)
The proposed GM-GIC algorithm for the identification of
unobservable FDI attacks is provided in Algorithm 4.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, the performance of the proposed methods
is demonstrated for the tasks of detection and identification
of unobservable FDI attacks and for the task of PSSE in the
presence of these attacks. The simulations are conducted on
the IEEE-30 bus test case, where the topology matrix and
measurement data are extracted using the Matpower toolbox
for Matlab [62]. In the remainder of this section the simulation
set-up is defined in Subsection V-A, while the proposed
method’s performance is demonstrated in Subsection V-B.
A. Set-up
1) Measurements: The simulation study is conducted on
the difference-based model in (14). For the sake of simplicity
of implementation, we ensure Assumption A.2, by defining
the set V˜ to include only state variables that are related to
load measurements, and then restricting the support of the
state attack vector by Λ ⊆ V˜ . In each simulation, we set the
cardinality of the state attack support vector by |Λ| = Ka
and draw the support vector, Λ, uniformly from the set
{Λ ∈ V˜ : |Λ| = Ka}. The attack coefficients on the chosen
support are randomly drawn from the continuous uniform
distribution over the interval [−1, 1]. Then, the coefficients are
uniformly scaled to obtain a desired value of the normalized
attack norm, ||a||Ka .
From (43), (45), and (46), the differential state vector is
obtained by, ∆θ = θt+1 − θt. The state vector at time t, θt,
is set to the values in the IEEE test case [62]. In order to
ensure Assumption A.4, the state vector at time t + 1, θt+1,
is simulated, based on the measurements at time t, by first
updating only the load measurement with random scaling:
φHL,:θt; φ ∼ N (1, σ2sI), (69)
and then computing θt+1 by the rundcpf(·) Matpower com-
mand in [62]. In addition, throughout the simulations, the noise
is modeled as in (10) with σ2e = 0.01.
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Algorithm 4: GM-GIC
Input:
• difference-based measurements: ∆z
• network parameters: H, V , L
• maximal sparsity level: Kc
• energy threshold: ρ
Algorithm Steps:
1) stage 1 (prescreening):
• compose the set:
S ⊂ V = {m ∈ V : ||Pm∆zL||2 > ρ},
where Pm is described in (60).
• if S = ∅: then set ΛˆGM-GIC = ∅ and stop
2) stage 2 (partition): divide S into disjoint subsets
{Sq}Qq=1 by Algorithm 3
3) stage 3 (support estimation):
• for q = 1 : Q
– create candidate state attack support sets:
G SqKc := {Λ ⊂ Sq : 1 ≤ |Λ| ≤ Kc}
– apply structural-constrained GIC in Algorithm 1,
with G SqKc , to achieve Λˆq
• compute:
ΛˆGM-GIC =
Q⋃
q=1
Λˆq
4) stage 4 (sparsity level correction): if |ΛˆGM-GIC| > Kc
• compute cˆML|i
ΛˆGM-GIC
by (33).
• sort by descending order:
I 4= {i1, i2, . . . , i|ΛˆGM-GIC|} = sort(cˆML|iΛˆGM-GIC),
• update estimated support:
ΛˆGM-GIC = {i1, i2, . . . iKc}.
Output: estimated support: Λs = ΛˆGM-GIC
2) Methods: The proposed methods include the structural-
constrained GIC method, developed in Section III and denoted
by GIC, and the low-complexity methods in Section IV, i.e.
the structural-constrained OMP, denoted by OMP, and the GM-
GIC methods. The tuning function for the GIC and GM-GIC
methods defined in (39) is set to be
τ(|Λi|) = ζ|Λi|+ γGICδ[|Λi|], (70)
where ζ and γGIC are user defined regularization parameters
and δ[·] is the Kronecker delta function. The term ζ|Λi|
is set to encourage sparse solutions for the identification
problem, while the term γGICδ(|Λi|) is set to maintain a
desired false alarm rate for the detection problem. The detec-
tion performance of the proposed methods is compared with
the following existing methods, which were modified to the
difference-based model in (14): 1) the BDD detector, obtained
by substituting (5) and z = ∆z in (8); 2) the energy detector,
denoted by ENG, obtained by substituting z = ∆z in (12); and
3) the GFT-based detector obtained by substituting θ = ∆θ
in Algorithm 1 in [40].
All numerical results were obtained using at least 500
Monte Carlo simulations. In addition, the detection thresholds
were computed from simulated historic data obtained by 500
simulations of (14) under the null hypothesis H0.
B. Simulations - IEEE-30 bus system
For the IEEE-30 bus test case, it can be verified
that the set V˜ , which is defined in Subsection V-A, is
V˜ = {14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20}. The probability of false alarm is
set to PFA = 0.05 unless stated otherwise. Furthermore, by
selecting the AIC in (30), the GIC tuning parameter in (70) is
set to ζ = 2. The maximal sparsity rate is set to Kc = 6.
1) Detection: In order to evaluate the detection perfor-
mance, we consider the IEEE-30 bus system with an attack
on three state variables, Ka = 3. The normalized norm of the
attack is set to ||a||Ka = 0.08 and the loads scaling variation in
(69) is set to σ2S = 0.01. The receiver operating characteristics
(ROC) curves of the different detectors are presented in Fig.
2 for this scenario. It can be seen that the performance of
the proposed low-complexity methods, GM-GIC, and OMP,
converge to those of the GIC method. In addition, the proposed
methods significantly outperform the existing methods: GFT,
ENG, and BDD. The BDD method resembles a detector with
a random choice, i.e. it is no better than flipping a coin, as
expected from the analysis of unobservable FDI attacks in
Subsection II-C.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
False alarm probability
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
De
tec
tio
n p
ro
ba
bil
ity
GIC
GM-GIC
OMP
GFT
ENG
BDD
Fig. 2. Unobservable FDI attack detection: The ROC curve is
of the GIC, GM-GIC, OMP, GFT, ENG, and BDD methods
with the set-up parameters: Ka = 3,
||a||
Ka
= 0.08, σ2s = 0.01
2) Identification: The identification of an unobservable FDI
attack, i.e. the recovery of the state attack vector true support,
Λ, is measured by the capability to classify each state variable
as manipulated or not. Therefore, we evaluate the identification
performance by the F-score classification metric [63]:
FS(Λˆ,Λ) =
2tp
2tp + fn + fp
, (71)
where Λ is the true support of the state attack vector, c. The
terms tp, fp, and fn, are the true-positive, false-positive, and
false-negative probabilities, respectively. The F-score metric
takes values between 0 and 1, where the value 1 means perfect
identification.
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The F-score of the GIC, GM-GIC, and OMP methods is
presented versus the normalized attack norm, ||a||Ka , for Ka = 4
in Fig. 3 (top) and versus the number of attacked elements,
Ka, for
||a||
Ka
= 0.3 in Fig. 3 (bottom). Both figures include
two cases of the load scaling variation parameter, σ2s = 0.05
and σ2s = 0.1. It can be seen in Fig. 3 (top) that for all
methods the F-score increases as the normalized attack, ||a||Ka ,
increases. In addition, all methods have a higher F-score for
lower load scaling variation. The proposed GIC method has
the highest F-score of all studied methods, and the GM-GIC
method outperforms the OMP method. In Fig. 3 (bottom) it
can be seen that for all the methods the F-score decreases
as Ka increases. That is, smaller attacks are easier to identify.
Furthermore, the GIC method shows the best performance and
the GM-GIC method outperforms the OMP method for any
choice of Ka.
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Fig. 3. Unobservable FDI attack identification: The F-score
of the proposed methods: GIC, GM-GIC, and OMP, versus
the normalized attack with Ka = 4 (top), and versus the
number of attacked elements with ||a||Ka = 0.3 (bottom), for
σ2s = 0.05, 0.1.
3) PSSE: The mean-squared-error (MSE) of the PSSE in
(48)-(49), where the attack is estimated by the methods GIC,
GM-GIC, and OMP, is presented in Fig. 4 versus the normal-
ized attack norm, ||a||Ka , and is compared to the conventional
PSSE by the WLS estimator in (5). The simulation parameters
are the same as those of in Fig. 3. It can be seen that for
all methods the MSE increases as the normalized attack,
||a||
Ka
, increases. In addition, the conventional PSSE has a
much higher MSE than the MSE obtained by the proposed
methods. Similarly to the identification performance, the GIC
method has the best performance and the GM-GIC method
outperforms the OMP method.
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Fig. 4. PSSE in the presence of unobservable FDI attacks: The
MSE rate versus the normalized attack norm ||a||Ka for σ
2
s =
0.05, 0.1.
4) Run-time: In Fig. 5, the averaged run-time is presented
versus the number of nodes attacked, Ka. It can be seen that
the GIC method requires the highest run-time in a significant
manner w.r.t. the low complexity GM-GIC and OMP methods.
In addition, the GM-GIC method requires more run-time than
the OMP method, where both methods can be executed in less
than one second for the presented cases. Thus, the required
run-time for both low complexity methods can be considered
feasible for the identification task. Therefore, although the GIC
method shows the best performance w.r.t. the identification and
PSSE task, its complexity precludes it from being a practical
method for larger networks.
1 2 3 4 5 6
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
102
Fig. 5. Unobservable FDI attack identification: run-time pre-
sented verses the number of nodes attacked. The simulations
are conducted on the IEEE-30 bus test case for σ2s = 0.05, 0.1
and ||a||Ka = 0.3.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduce novel methods for the iden-
tification of unobservable FDI attacks. This is implemented
by defining structural constraints on both the attack and the
typical load change, formulating, based on the constraints,
the identification problem as a model selection problem, and
solving the selection problem using the GIC rule. As by-
products of the identification process, the proposed method
also provides the detection of unobservable FDI attacks and
enables the PSSE under the presence of these attacks. Since
the identification process is solved by an NP-hard optimization
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problem, we propose two low-complexity methods: 1) an OMP
based method that relies on the proposed structural and sparse
constraints; and 2) the novel GM-GIC method that exploits
the graph Markovian property of order two of the graph
representation of power systems. We show by simulations that
the proposed methods outperform existing detection methods.
In addition, simulation results confirm that the proposed GIC,
GM-GIC and OMP methods are feasible for the identification
of unobservable attacks and for PSSE in the presence of these
attacks. In addition, simulations show that the PSSE conducted
by the proposed methods significantly reduces the estimation
error in comparison to the standard WLS estimation. Further-
more, for both identification and PSSE the low-complexity
GM-GIC method shows better results than the OMP method
and is close in performance to the GIC method. It is shown
that both the GM-GIC and the OMP methods require a short
run-time that is feasible for power systems.
APPENDIX A
In Proposition 1 in [53] it was shown that under the
assumption that the powers injected in the nodes are Gaussian
and mutually independent, the topology matrix columns satisfy
HTV,mHV,k = 0, ∀k,m ∈ V, d(k,m) > 2. (72)
Similarly, it can be shown that the subtopology matrix asso-
ciated with the load buses’ columns satisfy
HTL,mHL,k = 0, ∀k,m ∈ V, d(k,m) > 2. (73)
Therefore, by using (20) with Λi = m and (73) we obtain that
PmHL,k = HL,m(HTL,mHL,m)
−1HTL,mHL,k = 0, (74)
∀k,m ∈ V, d(k,m) > 2. In addition, by substituting (55) in
(56) we obtain
ak,m = PmHL,kEkc. (75)
Then, by substituting (74) in (75) we obtain (57).
Similarly, by substituting k = m in (56), we obtain
ak,k = Pka
k
L, ∀k ∈ V. (76)
By substituting (54) in (76) and then using the property in
(23) we obtain
ak,k = akL, ∀k ∈ V. (77)
From the properties of projection matrices it can be verified
(see Theorem 2.22, p.46 in [58]) that
||PmakL|| ≤ ||akL||, ∀k,m ∈ V. (78)
By substituting (56) in (78) we obtain (58).
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